Nudges in exercise commitment contracts a randomized trial
Nudges in Exercise Commitment Contracts: A Randomized Trial Jay Bhattacharya, Alan M. Garber, and Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert NBER Working Paper No. 21406 July 2015 JEL No. D6,I1,I12 ABSTRACT We consider the welfare consequences of nudges and other behavioral economic devices to encourage exercise habit formation. Nudges in Exercise Commitment Contracts: A Randomized Trial Jay Bhattacharya, Alan M. Garber, Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert. NBER Working Paper No. 21406 Issued in July 2015 NBER Program(s):Health Care Program, Health Economics Program We consider the welfare consequences of nudges and other behavioral economic devices to encourage exercise habit formation. Abstract. We consider the welfare consequences of nudges and other behavioral economic devices to encourage exercise habit formation. We analyze a randomized trial of nudged exercise commitment contracts in the context of a time-inconsistent intertemporal utility maximization model of the demand for exercise.